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Abstract 
Relational contracting is a method designed to improve relationships between 
contracted parties.  The federal construction sector was a leader in the development and 
implementation of an early form of relational contracting known as partnering.  Since 
then, alliancing has emerged as the new evolution of relational contracts. While it 
provides many potential benefits to contracting parties, alliancing has not yet been 
utilized in federal construction procurement, which is subject to stringent regulations.   
A commercially available standard form alliancing contract was selected for 
analysis against the Federal Acquisition Regulation.  Key practices that characterize the 
alliancing method were identified.  Utilizing a panel of federal contracting experts, 
qualitative data were gathered to analyze which of these key practices do or do not 
comply with federal regulations, why certain practices do not comply, and how those 
practices could achieve compliance.   
The results show that most alliancing key practices can be utilized in a federal 
construction project.  While some practices cannot be used effectively under current 
regulations, these limitations do not significantly hinder the use of a comprehensive and 
effective federal alliancing contract.   
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APPLICATION OF RELATIONAL CONTRACTING METHODS TO FEDERAL 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS  
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
A business contract that does not contain a high degree of planning of the 
exchange relationship has a greater opportunity for good faith disputes (Macaulay, 1963). 
Traditional contracting methods do not provide sufficient provisions for addressing the 
future events that will affect project relationships, nor can they.  In a field as uncertain 
and complex as construction, these events cannot be perceived or quantified with 
accuracy.  Therefore contracts should be flexible in order to adjust for future events and 
address uncertainties when they arise (Macneil, 1974, 1980).  In order to be flexible, a 
contract must focus on relationships. 
Relational contracting is a topic that has seen increased academic focus, but there 
is still no consensus on a precise and comprehensive definition of the concept (Chan et al, 
2010). Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that complex concepts are unable to be defined in 
this traditional way because there may not be a single set of characteristics that are 
common for all variants of a concept (Nyström, 2005; Yeung et al., 2007).  He likened 
this idea to the resemblance between family members.  Some of them may have the same 
type of nose, ears, or eyes, but no one feature is common to every member.  However, 
there is still a family resemblance common to all the members of the family (Kenny, 
1975). 
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This is a very appropriate way to define relational contracting.  While no specific 
feature is maintained throughout every example of it, a family resemblance is maintained.  
Wittgenstein’s concept has been previously applied to partnering (Nyström, 2005) and 
alliancing (Yeung et al., 2007).  More recently, Chan et al. (2010) utilized the 
Wittgenstein concept and both of these previous researchers’ work to develop a model of 
the elements of relational contracting.  Chan et al. identified twelve elements that form 
the family resemblance model (Figure 1).  These twelve elements provide one of the best 
definitions of relational contracting available in the literature, and they outline separate 
concepts that can be used to create a method of improving project performance. 
 
 
Figure 1 Wittgenstein Model (Chan et al., 2010) 
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Research Questions 
Many federal projects, especially those conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, have begun to develop better relationships, trust, and commitment through 
partnering agreements.  But partnering is only a small step in the right direction. A 
potential obstacle to implementing more advanced relational contracting methods is 
perceived incompatibilities with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).  The purpose 
of this thesis is to develop a framework of implementing relational contracting concepts 
in federal construction contracts by answering the following research questions: 
Do relational contracting methods meet the requirements of the FAR? Why or why not? 
How can relational contracting methods be implemented within the FAR? 
Scope and Approach 
A qualitative case study approach was selected for its ability to provide a “detailed, 
extensive study of a particular contextual and bounded phenomenon that is undertaken in 
real life situations.” (Luck et al., 2006).  The method for this research was developed 
utilizing Yin’s (2009) five components of a case study research design: 
1. A study’s questions 
2. Its propositions 
3. Its units of analysis 
4. The logic linking the data to the propositions 
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings (decision) 
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The first component, the study’s questions, form the “who,” “what,” “where,” “how,” 
and “why” of the case under study (Yin, 2009).  A case study approach is most 
appropriate for “how” and “why” questions, making it a suitable methodology for the 
research questions stated above.   
While the research questions capture the outcomes desired by a study, they do not 
point to how the study should be conducted.  A proposition outlines a possible answer to 
the research question and “directs attention to something that should be examined within 
the scope of study” (Yin, 2009).  The propositions can outline a hypothesis that can be 
tested or at least give a starting point for collecting evidence.  The current proposition is 
that relational contracting is not allowed by the current federal acquisition regulations and 
a construction contract that attempts to implement relational contracting methods will be 
disapproved by the contracting officer.  This proposition outlines the problem in a way 
that can be tested. 
The third component develops the definition of a “case,” and determines how that 
case will be studied through its units of analysis.  Yin (2009) defines three elements of a 
case study that must be defined in this step: the case, the units of analysis, and the units of 
data collection.  The case is the interesting topic (or topics) of the study that is bounded 
by a particular context.  The units of analysis are different components of the case that 
will be individually analyzed.  The units of data collection are the actual sources of 
information used to answer the research questions.   
An embedded single case design was selected for this research, which is composed of 
a single case and multiple units of analysis.  The single case design is appropriate for 
studies that have a clear set of circumstances within which its propositions are believed to 
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be true (Yin, 2009). The Federal Acquisition Regulation provides a clear set of 
circumstances under which to evaluate the case of a relational construction contract.  
Because of the varying nature of a relational contract and the many elements they can be 
composed of, multiple units of analysis were used.  Each unit of analysis is a definitive 
relational method utilized by a relational contract.   
The data collection source for this study was an expert panel, each of which 
separately analyzed each unit of analysis for compliance with the FAR.  Each expert was 
sent the relational techniques identified and a semi-structured questionnaire for each 
technique.  The questionnaire consisted of questions that direct the expert to identify 
aspects of the proposed technique that meet or do not meet the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation, the section of the FAR that allows or disallows it, and possible changes to 
achieve FAR compliance. The questionnaire identified important or possibly contentious 
sections of each contractual method for each reviewer to comment on. It also included a 
section for the individual to include free form comments.   
The collected data is easily linked to the propositions.  The data collection creates a 
review of each unit of analysis that is very similar to the review required if an actual 
relational contract were to be implemented, utilizing the federal acquisition regulations as 
a basis for assessment.    
Preview 
This thesis uses the scholarly article format.  The following chapters are the 
articles produced from the research.  The first is a conference paper submitted to the 16th 
International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium held in 
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Quebec City, Canada 21-23 June 2011.  The conference paper is Chapter 2 and consists 
of a review of three advanced relational contracts and the methods they employ.  This 
paper is primarily focused on a review and analysis of available literature.  The second 
article in Chapter 3 was submitted to the American Society of Civil Engineers Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management.  This article provides the body of this thesis 
and contains all the elements of research in its layout as prescribed by the peer review 
journal.  As an independent chapter, it includes an abstract, introduction, literature 
review, objective, research question and methods, analysis and results, recommendation, 
and conclusions.  Many of the concepts explored in the conference paper were used as a 
basis for the introduction and literature review of the journal article.  Chapter 4 offers a 
final discussion of the significance of the research, its limitations, and possible areas for 
future research.   
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II. Literature Review Conference Paper 
Submitted to 16th International Command and Control Research and Technology 
Symposium 
Quebec City, Canada 21-23 June 2011 
Evolution of Relational Contracting in Construction: Project Delivery Methods 
Beyond Partnering 
Travis Johnson; William Sitzabee Ph.D., P.E.; Peter Feng Ph.D., P.E. 
Abstract 
 
Improving formal and informal relationships between parties is a major aspiration 
of every construction project.  The United States Army Corps of Engineers led the way in 
developing relational contracting methods in the 1980s with the introduction of 
partnering. While partnering remains the Corps' standard, relational contracting continues 
to evolve.  Advanced relational methods were pioneered in the 1990s and 2000s in 
countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia, quickly becoming standard practice 
in their public sectors.  In the last three years, the commercial publication of two major 
standard form boilerplate contracts has made this new generation of relational contracts 
widely available in the United States.  Introducing specific contractually-binding 
requirements for equitable relationships, risk sharing, and integrated project delivery, 
these contracts offer significant opportunities for a highly collaborative and successful 
construction project.  This paper presents several key practices of modern relational 
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contracts and how implementation of these practices can benefit project success by 
reducing cost growth, improving construction quality, and lowering the risk of litigation. 
Introduction 
  Military construction is an exceptional example of the importance of managing 
operations between civilian and military entities.  Each project is a large and complex 
undertaking contracted between the federal government and civilian businesses.  The 
United States military makes a vast investment in construction each year; the 2011 
Military Construction program for the U.S. Air Force alone is projected to exceed $1.3 
Billion (Department of the Air Force, 2010).  Receiving the greatest return from this 
investment requires proper management of each construction project. 
However, failing to properly manage relationships has been a continuing problem 
within the construction industry, causing poor cooperation, limited trust, and ineffective 
communication (Moore et al., 1992).  Relational contracting is a concept designed to 
address these problems.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers took a leading role in the use 
of relational contracts in the 1980s, developing and implementing partnering at the 
Portland, Oregon (Gerard, 1995) and Mobile, Alabama districts (Sanders & Moore, 
1992).   The Corps inaugural partnering project was the construction of the Oliver Lock 
and Dam, which began in 1988 with a partnering agreement between the Corps Mobile 
District and the construction contractor FRU-CON (Schroer, 1994).   
Partnering proved to be a genuine success.  A study of Corps construction projects 
by Weston and Gibson (1993) compared 16 partnering projects to 28 non-partnering 
projects.  The study found that partnering projects achieved much better performance, 
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averaging an improvement of 40-80 percent in the aspects of change order costs, claims 
costs, total project cost growth, and duration change over non-partnered projects.  
Recognizing their success, the Corps quickly embraced the philosophy of partnering and 
made it a standard way of doing business (Schroer, 1994).  In 1993, then Commander of 
the US Army Corps of Engineers Lieutenant General Arthur Williams (1993) set the 
“policy of the Corps of Engineers to develop, promote and practice partnering on all 
constructions contracts, and to universally apply the concept to all other relationships.”   
In the 1990s, partnering also became an established approach to contracting in the 
United States private sector, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Hong Kong (Bresnen 
and Marshall, 2000a, b).  However, the concept of relational contracting in these markets 
has evolved much more rapidly than the U.S. public sector.  The government of Hong 
Kong utilizes an expanded form of partnering that utilizes incentivization agreements, 
and the UK and Australia have developed advanced forms of relational contracting that 
have become standard practice in public sector construction (Chan et al., 2010; NEC, 
2010; Department of Treasury and Finance, 2009).  
Advancement in relational contracting in the U.S. private sector has been driven 
by the concept of Integrated Project Delivery (IPD).  IPD contracts were pioneered in 
2005 with the Integrated Form of Agreement, developed by Will Lichtig for Sutter Health 
(Post, 2010).  In the last few years, the IPD method has become more accessible than 
ever with the commercial publication of standard form contracts by ConsensusDOCS and 
the American Institute of Architects.  These model contracts provide a solid baseline for 
project parties, allowing them to easily complete a comprehensive contract by simply 
filling in the details of their particular project.   
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Types of Relational Contracts 
Generally known as alliancing, the new generation relational contracts utilized by 
international governments and the U.S. private sector are an evolution of the partnering 
concept developed and still relied upon by the Corps.  Before discussing the specific 
contracts, it is important to recognize and understand the four major types of single-
project relational contracts: project partnering, project alliancing, joint venture, and 
public private partnership.   
Every contract contains an implied commitment requiring each party to not hinder 
or delay the performance of any other party (George A. Fuller Co. v. United States, 
1947).  This sets a basic contract standard of cooperation.  The objective of partnering is 
to change this from a standard of non-interference to a team-based standard of mutual 
benefits.  The basis of partnering is the partnering agreement, a non-contractual but 
formally structured charter in which each party promises to act in the best interest of the 
project and the project team (Chan et al., 2001).  The partnering process utilizes tools 
such as regular meetings, partnering workshops, team building exercises, declarations of 
common objectives, and dispute resolution mechanisms.  Its goals are to create an 
atmosphere of communication, problem solving, harmonious working relationships, and 
shared goals.  While this process does deliver mutual benefits, it falls short of 
guaranteeing that each party will equally benefit (Walker et al., 2002).  It encourages a 
team approach, but gains and losses are still allocated severally, not jointly.  Partnering 
does not replace the obligations to adhere to the formal contract, and it lacks the definite 
incentives required to elevate collective interests above those of the individual. 
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Project alliancing differs from project partnering in that it is both a relationship 
management system and a project delivery system (Chan et al., 2010).  Traditional 
contracting and partnering allocates responsibilities and risk to individually parties that 
severally incur consequences for success or failure of the project. Alliancing requires a 
‘joint’ rather than a ‘shared’ commitment; parties consent to their contribution levels and 
jointly incur rewards or losses (Walker et al., 2000).  Three key features define a ‘pure’ 
alliance:  
1. Parties are all responsible for performing the work and assume collective 
ownership of risk.  
2. Participants share in the “pain” or “gain” depending on how actual project 
outcomes compare to targets.  
3. The project is governed by a joint body where all decisions must be 
unanimous (Chan et al., 2010).   
The advanced relational contracts explored under this paper fall under the 
category of alliances.  While they allow some variation from the definition of a ‘pure’ 
alliance, they implement all the major ideals. 
Joint ventures and public-private partnerships are two other relational contract 
forms that are not explored in this paper, but are worth mentioning.  While alliancing 
jointly shares the risk and rewards of a project, the parties remain legally independent 
organizations with separate ownership and management (Gerybadze, 1995). However, a 
joint venture is the creation of jointly owned entity created by separate organizations 
sharing their funds, personnel and services.  The American Institute of Architects’ 
Document C195 – 2008: “Standard Form Single Purpose Entity Agreement for Integrated 
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Project Delivery” is a step in this direction, forming the participants into a Limited 
Liability Company.   
Public private partnership does not have a set definition or a standard framework, 
but is typically defined as a market driven approach for government procurement (Chan 
et al., 2010).  It can take forms such as build-operate-transfer, build-own-operate, leasing, 
operation and management, equity joint venture, and cooperative joint venture.  This 
concept has been used extensively in the privatization of government services, such as 
waste disposal, vehicle and facility maintenance, and military housing. 
The Contracts 
This paper will explore three existing boilerplate contract approaches.  Two of 
American origin: ConsensusDOCS 300 and AIA Document C191-2009 and one from the 
United Kingdom: NEC3 Engineering and Construction Contract.  
ConsensusDOCS describes itself as “a coalition of associations representing 
diverse interests in the construction industry that collaboratively develops and promotes 
standard form construction contract documents that advance the construction process” 
(ConsensusDOCS, 2010). The organization counts 32 associations as part of their 
coalition, the most notable of which is the Associated General Contractors of America 
(AGC).  ConsensusDOCS 300 Standard Form of Tri-Party Agreement for Collaborative 
Project Delivery, first published in September 2007, is touted as the signature document 
of their catalog and the first standard construction contract to address Integrated Project 
Delivery (Perlberg, 2009). 
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The American Institute of Architects first began publishing construction contracts 
in 1888, and currently publishes more than 120 contracts and administrative forms for the 
construction industry (AIA, 2010b).  AIA publishes three series of Integrated Project 
Delivery documents, differentiated by how the parties contract with each other. Published 
in November 2009, AIA Document C191-2009 Standard Form Multi-Party Agreement 
for Integrated Project Delivery, like ConsensusDOCS 300, is a three party agreement 
between the owner, designer, and constructor (AIA, 2009).  AIA’s other IPD contracts 
allow for separate agreements between owner and designer and owner and constructor, as 
well as the formation of the three parties into a Limited Liability Corporation.  
The New Engineering Contract (NEC) is a set of standard contract documents 
developed by the Institution of Civil Engineers, a professional organization based in the 
United Kingdom.  Now on its third revision (NEC3), it was first published in 1993.  In 
2006, the United Kingdom’s Office of Government Commerce recommended the NEC3 
suite of construction contracts for use by public sector procurers (OGC, 2006).  The 
Engineering and Construction Contract (ECC) provides a cooperative agreement between 
an owner and constructor, and is the most popular document of the NEC3 series (Gerrard, 
2005).   The ECC provides many relational contracting tools when utilized with optional 
clause X12: Partnering. (NEC3 refers to this option as partnering, but it more closely 
resembles the definition of alliancing.)  When referring to the NEC3 ECC, this paper will 
include Option X12 as part of the contract. 
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Key Relational Practices 
These contracts utilize several key principles that have been shown to contribute 
to improved projects.  Several studies have shown significant links between relational 
contracting activities and project success.  Larson (1995), utilizing a data set of 280 
construction projects, related several success factors (such as schedule, cost, technical 
performance, and avoiding litigation) to the level of relationship between the parties 
(from adversarial to full partners).  The study found a significant positive effect on 
success when moving from an adversarial project to a relational one, and from an 
informal relational project to a formal relational contract.  In a later study using an 
expanded data set, Larson (1997) related individual relational contracting principles to 
the same indicators of success.  A few of the strongest predictors for project success were 
establishment of a problem-solving process, top management support, provisions for 
continuous improvement, and establishing the assumption of a fair profit for the 
contractor.  
In another study, Chan et al. (2004) performed a survey of critical relational 
contracting success factors in the Hong Kong construction industry.  Their regression 
analysis of the results identified five significant underlying factors contributing to overall 
success:  
1.  The establishment and communication of a conflict resolution strategy 
2.  A willingness to share resources among project participants  
3.  A clear definition of responsibilities  
4.  A commitment to a win-win attitude  
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5.  Regular monitoring  
Cheng and Li’s (2002) study of construction success factors found the top ranked 
factors for the application of relational contracting are (in order of most important to 
least): open communication, mutual trust, effective coordination, top management 
support, and joint problem solving. 
 The basic principles of successful relational contracting are implemented in actual 
contracts by several basic methods.  Joint Decision Making implements the principles of 
mutual trust, top management support, effective coordination, and a problem-solving 
process.  When Joint Decision Making cannot resolve an issue, a clear Dispute 
Resolution Process provides a strategy for conflict resolution. Pain/Gain Sharing 
addresses principles such as fair profit, shared resources, a win-win attitude, and 
continuous improvement. The principles of mutual trust and willingness to share 
resources (and risk) are also implemented with Shared Risk.  The similarities and 
differences between the contracts in each of these categories are summarized in Table 1.   
Joint Decision Making 
 ConsensusDOCS 300 utilizes two groups to facilitate the project: the 
Collaborative Project Delivery (CPD) Team and the Management Group.  The CPD 
Team meets at least weekly and executes the daily activities of the project, while the 
Management Group is the decision making body.  Both groups are comprised of three 
core individuals selected to represent the Owner, Designer, and Constructor.  In the 
Management Group, each representative has full authority to make decisions that bind the 
represented organization.  The CPD Team is expected to add design consultants and trade 
contractors through joining agreements as the project progresses.  Other members may 
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Table 1: Contract Comparison 
 ConsensusDOCS 300 AIA C191 – 2009 NEC3 ECC w/ X12 
Joint Decision 
Making 
-Executive team: Decide 
by consensus 
-Management team: No 
formal decision process 
-Executive team: 
Unanimous decisions 
-Management team: 
Unanimous decisions 
-Executive team: No 
formal decision 
process 
 
Shared Risk 
-Waives consequential 
damages 
-Shared liability option 
or 
-Traditional liability 
option w/Optional 
liability limits 
-Waives consequential 
damages 
-Shared liability 
 
-Clear division of risk 
Pain/Gain 
Sharing 
-Gain sharing distributed 
by agreed percentages 
-Optional pain sharing 
    --Agreed percentages 
    --Optional loss limits 
-Gain sharing distributed 
by agreed percentages 
-Pain sharing 
    --Agreed percentages 
    --Loss limits 
-Gain sharing 
distributed by agreed 
percentages 
-Pain sharing 
distributed by agreed 
percentages 
 
Dispute 
Resolution 
-Executive team 
decision 
before 
-Mitigation or Mediation 
before 
-Binding Arbitration or 
Litigation 
-Executive team 
decision 
before 
-Mediation 
before 
-Binding Arbitration, 
Litigation, or Any 
Agreed Method 
-Executive team 
decision 
before 
-Binding Arbitration 
before 
- Litigation 
 
also be brought into the Management Group and fully participate, but ultimate decision 
making power resides with the three original members.  The Management Group is 
designed to make decisions in the best interest of the project as a whole, not each 
member’s own interest.  To this end, all decisions made by the Management Group are 
by consensus.   If consensus cannot be reached between the three core members, the 
owner reserves the right to make a final determination.  There is one exception, with the 
designer reserving the right to decision in cases of life, health, property and public 
welfare that require a licensed design professional.  In cases of a unilateral decision, the 
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other parties may utilize the dispute resolution provisions of the contract. No formal 
decision making process is outlined for the CPD Team. 
 AIA Document C191-2009 uses a very similar process, creating a Project 
Executive Team for executive oversight and a Project Management Team for day-to-day 
management.  Each group is created by representatives from the Owner, Architect, and 
Contractor, along with any additional parties decided at the beginning of the project. Both 
teams operate by unanimous decision of all members.  A failure to reach unanimity by 
the Project Management Team is brought to the Project Executive Team.  If the executive 
team cannot reach a unanimous decision, the owner may issue a written directive that the 
parties shall comply with.  In the absence of a unanimous decision, a matter can be 
submitted to the contract’s dispute resolution process.  
 It is difficult to ascertain a difference of practice between ConsensusDOCS 300’s 
decision by “consensus” and AIA C191’s unanimous decision making. Consensus is a 
term debated in the political field, and it can be viewed as a continuous variable ranging 
from simple majority to unanimity (McClosky, 1964). A generally accepted definition of 
consensus would indicate a finding that is nearly unanimous and not just a majority 
opinion (D’Amato, 1970; Wright, 1966).  The project parties would likely operate by this 
definition, but a different term (or a clear definition) would remove ambiguity from the 
ConsensusDOCS document.   
 The NEC3 Engineering and Construction Contract also creates a joint 
management group, but does not provide a formal process structure.  The ECC requires 
the project parties to create a Schedule of Partners, identifying the main stake holders that 
will have say in the project.  These Partners select the members of the Core Group.  The 
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Core Group, led by the owner’s representative, acts and makes decisions on behalf of the 
Partners within guidelines set at the beginning of the project.  The contract does not 
provide formal processes for the Core Group, allowing it to set its own procedures. 
Shared Risk 
 ConsensusDOCS 300 offers two risk allocation options: Safe Harbor Decisions or 
Traditional Risk Allocation.  The former option releases the parties from liability for 
“risks arising from collaboratively reached and mutually agreed-upon. Project decisions 
made by the Management Group (Safe Harbor Decisions),” if acting in good faith and not 
in willful default of the contract (ConsensusDOCS, 2007).  The traditional risk option 
holds each party liable for its own “negligence and breaches of contract and warranty,” 
but contains optional clauses to set individual monetary limits on the total liability of the 
designer and constructor.  Regardless of the risk allocation option chosen, the contract 
requires the parties to waive the right to claims of consequential damages against each 
other. 
 In contrast, AIA C191 waives all claims except in cases such as willful 
misconduct, express warranty obligations, claims for payment of amounts due, damages 
filed against the project by outside parties, express liquidated damages clause, or when 
insurance proceeds are available for the claim.  The contract also includes a waiver of 
consequential damages and rights of subrogation, as well as indemnity clauses for 
property damage, bodily injury, and vicarious liability.  All claims that are permitted by 
the contract must be pursued through the agreed dispute resolution process.  
 The ECC does not have the same kind of risk sharing.  It clearly outlines the risks 
borne by the owner, and places all other risks on the constructor.  Each party indemnifies 
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the other against claims due to an event which is at his own risk, except in cases where an 
event at the risk of one party contributes to an event at the risk of the other.  
Pain/Gain Sharing 
 ConsensusDOCS 300 provides for pain or gain sharing between the parties.  Gain 
sharing is a fixed section of the contract, and the parties determine agreed percentages or 
other basis for sharing savings if the project costs are less than the Project Target Cost 
Estimate (PTCE).   ConsensusDOCS allows for two options in case the project costs 
exceed the PTCE, allowing for the costs to be either borne by the owner or shared among 
the three parties.  Again, the agreed percentages or other basis for sharing are to be 
determined by the parties and indicated on the contract.  There is also an optional 
provision to limit the designer’s and constructor’s loss limit to their respective overhead 
and profit, or the potential for loss can be unlimited. 
 AIA C191 uses the same method for gain sharing, allowing the parties to agree 
upon share percentages for savings realized by actual costs less than the target cost.  AIA 
also includes an option for pain sharing, but with losses for designer and constructor 
strictly limited to their overhead and profit. 
 The ECC also implements pain and gain sharing in its target cost contracts. Using 
share percentages, the contractor is paid a share of the savings or pays a share of the 
excess cost.  
Dispute Resolution 
 A three-step dispute resolution procedure is utilized in the ConsensusDOCS 300 
contract, with some steps depending on the selection of the parties at the formation of the 
contract.  A dispute that cannot be resolved between the directly involved parties is first 
20 
submitted to the Management Group for resolution.  If the Management Group is unable 
to resolve the issue, the dispute will move to either mitigation or mediation.   Mitigation 
utilizes either a project neutral or dispute review board to issue a nonbinding ruling on 
the dispute, while mediation brings in a third-party to help bring the project participants 
to an agreement.  If neither of these options brings about a settlement, the binding 
resolution process is used.  The contract offers two options, litigation in state or federal 
court, or arbitration using a pre-agreed arbitration method. 
 AIA C191 uses a dispute resolution committee, formed from senior managers 
from each party and a designated neutral party (known as the “project neutral”) to resolve 
disputes that cannot be settled by the Project Executive Team.  The project neutral uses 
pre-established mediation procedures to mediate a resolution of the dispute.  If the parties 
fail to come to an agreement from mediation, the contract offers arbitration by the project 
neutral, arbitration through another entity, or any other method pre-agreed to by the 
parties. 
 When using the dispute resolution option of the contract, disputes in an ECC 
project that cannot be resolved by the project parties proceeds directly to arbitration by an 
adjudicator appointed by the parties at the formation of the contract.  The adjudicator’s 
decision is binding, but parties can refer it for review and final decision to governmental 
tribunals. 
Summary 
 Project alliancing, the next evolution of relational contracting, also presents some 
significant difficulties and potential problems along with its benefits.  It requires 
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considerable involvement and commitment of personnel and top management to support 
the process and to maintain the strong personal and corporate relationships required for a 
successful project.  Along with the cultural shift required from traditional contract 
relationships, this could require significant costs for training, education, and labor hours 
(Ross, 2001).  Shared risk environments, waiving claims and liability, also present a 
major challenge for conventional liability insurance.  Providing robust insurance products 
for shared risk projects requires a fundamental change in the conventional underwriting 
approach, and while some insurers are addressing this problem, insurance difficulties 
may be common until specialized policies are offered (Post, 2010).  Similar problems 
may be encountered with project bonding and surety relationships that normally operate 
in a traditional claims environment. 
If these difficulties can be overcome, all of these contracts utilize key principles 
that, when properly implemented, can significantly improve project relationships.  In 
particular, ConsensusDOCS 300 and AIA C191 both offer robust relational contracting 
tools, as well as a complete, comprehensive, and usable contract.  The ConsensusDOCS 
and AIA contracts are clearly more dedicated to relational contracting methods than the 
NEC3 ECC, not only offering more methods but more fully developing them in the 
contracts.  While both contracts are quite similar, ConsensusDOCS 300 offers more tools 
and flexibility in the preceding categories than AIA C191.   
U.S. military construction, led by the Army Corps of Engineers, was a leader in 
the development and implementation of partnering, but is currently a spectator in the field 
of alliancing.  The private sector has supplied two excellent alliance examples in 
ConsensusDOCS 300 and AIA C191.  To stay on the cutting edge of construction 
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contracts, the U.S. military should use one of these boilerplate contracts, in whole or in 
part, to develop a federal alliance contract.  Some alliance practices may be inhibited by 
the current Federal Acquisition Regulation, but now is the time for the military to 
investigate and resolve these discrepancies.  By developing and beginning to implement 
an alliance contract now (at least on a test basis), the U.S. military can take advantage of 
an excellent opportunity for construction value and efficiency in a time of economic 
difficulty.   
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or 
the United States Government. 
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Abstract 
Relational contracting is a method designed to improve relationships between 
contracted parties.  The federal construction sector was a leader in the development and 
implementation of an early form of relational contracting known as partnering.  Since 
then, alliancing has emerged as the new evolution of relational contracts. While it 
provides many potential benefits to contracting parties, alliancing has not yet been 
utilized in federal construction procurement, which is subject to stringent regulations.   
A commercially available standard form alliancing contract was selected for 
analysis against the Federal Acquisition Regulation.  Key practices that characterize the 
alliancing method were identified.  Utilizing a panel of federal contracting experts, 
qualitative data were gathered to analyze which of these key practices do or do not 
comply with federal regulations, why certain practices do not comply, and how those 
practices could achieve compliance.   
The results show that most alliancing key practices can be utilized in a federal 
construction project.  While some practices cannot be used effectively under current 
regulations, these limitations do not significantly hinder the use of a comprehensive and 
effective federal alliancing contract.   
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Introduction and Background 
Failing to properly manage relationships has been a continuing problem within 
the construction industry, causing poor cooperation, limited trust, and ineffective 
communication (Moore et al., 1992).  If not managed effectively, complex relationships 
between the interested parties can adversely affect a project’s performance (Walker, 
1989).   One method for enhancing project relationships and addressing the complexity 
inherent in construction is the concept of relational contracting.  Relational contracting is 
based on the recognition of mutual benefits and “win-win” scenarios that can be created 
through more cooperative relationships between the project parties (Kumaraswamy et al., 
2005).   
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers took a leading role in the use of relational 
contracts in the 1980s, developing and implementing partnering in the Portland, Oregon 
(Gerard, 1995; Naoum, 2003) and Mobile, Alabama districts (Sanders & Moore, 1992).   
The Corps inaugural partnering project was the construction of the Oliver Lock and Dam, 
which began in 1988 with a partnering agreement between the Corps Mobile District and 
the construction contractor FRU-CON (Schroer, 1994).   
As the first type of relational contracting, partnering proved to be a genuine 
success.  A study of Corps construction projects by Weston and Gibson (1993) compared 
16 partnering projects to 28 non-partnering projects.  The study found that partnering 
projects achieved much better performance, averaging an improvement of 40-80% in the 
aspects of cost change, change order cost, claims costs, and duration change over non-
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partnered projects.  Recognizing their success, the Corps quickly embraced the 
philosophy of partnering and made it a standard way of doing business (Schroer, 1994).  
In 1993, then Commander of the US Army Corps of Engineers Lieutenant General Arthur 
Williams set the “policy of the Corps of Engineers to develop, promote and practice 
partnering on all constructions contracts, and to universally apply the concept to all other 
relationships” (Williams, 1993).   
Partnering has allowed many federal project teams to develop better relationships, 
trust, and commitment, but it is only the first step in the right direction.  While this 
process does deliver mutual benefits, it lacks the definitive incentives required to elevate 
collective interests above those of the individual. 
To address this issue, expanded partnering and alliancing have become common 
abroad.  The government of Hong Kong uses an expanded form of partnering that 
includes incentivization agreements, and the United Kingdom and Australia use 
collaborative alliance contracts as a standard practice in public sector construction (Chan 
et al., 2010; NEC, 2010; Department of Treasury and Finance, 2009).  
The U.S. private sector has also significantly contributed to the development of 
relational contracting with a concept known as Integrated Project Delivery (IPD).  IPD 
contracts, a form of alliancing, were pioneered in 2005 with the Integrated Form of 
Agreement, developed by Will Lichtig for Sutter Health (Post, 2010).  Introducing 
specific contractually-binding requirements for equitable relationships, risk sharing, and 
dispute resolution, IPD proposes significant opportunities for a highly collaborative and 
successful construction project.  In the last few years, the IPD method has become more 
accessible than ever with the commercial publication of standard form contracts by 
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ConsensusDOCS and the American Institute of Architects (AIA).  These boilerplate 
contracts provide a solid baseline for project parties, allowing them to complete a 
comprehensive contract by simply filling in the details of their particular project.  While 
the use of IPD in construction is still in an early stage, AIA has used case studies as a 
proof of concept.  Analyzing six projects from 2004 to 2009 that implemented IPD 
practices, AIA claims that every project “met or exceeded the owner’s expectations with 
respect to budget, schedule, design quality, and sustainability and also met the financial 
expectations of designers and builders” (AIA, 2010a). 
A potential barrier to harnessing the benefits of an IPD contract in federal 
construction is the stringent requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).  
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the specific key practices of an IPD single 
project construction contract against the requirements of the FAR. 
Contract Types 
Integrated Project Delivery contracts fit the definition of an alliance, which is a 
fundamentally different type of relational contract than partnering.  The basis of 
partnering is the partnering agreement, a non-contractual but formally structured charter 
tying each party to act in the best interest of the project and the project team (Chan et al., 
2001).   It utilizes tools such as regular meetings, partnering workshops, team building 
exercises, declarations of common objectives, and dispute resolution mechanisms to 
encourage harmonious working relationships and shared goals.  While partnering drives 
towards common objectives, gains and losses are still allocated severally, not jointly.  
The partnering agreement establishes mutual goals, but it does not contractually enforce 
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or incentivize them.   It does not replace the obligations to adhere to the formal contract.  
While their goals may overlap in some areas, parties are ultimately rewarded for acting in 
their own interest.   
Project alliancing differs from project partnering in that it is both a relationship 
management system and a project delivery system (Chan et al., 2010).  Where partnering 
encourages closer relationships and shared goals, alliancing mandates them (Table 2).  
Traditional contracting and partnering allocate responsibilities and risk to individual 
parties that severally incur consequences for success or failure of the project. Alliancing 
requires a ‘joint’ rather than a ‘shared’ commitment; parties consent to their contribution 
levels and jointly incur rewards or losses (Walker et al., 2002).  Three key features define 
a ‘pure’ alliance:  
1. Parties are all responsible for performing the work and assume collective 
ownership of risk  
2. Participants share in the “pain” or “gain” depending on how actual project 
outcomes compare to targets  
3. The project is governed by a joint body where all decisions must be 
unanimous  
(Chan et al. 2010) 
While most IPD contracts allow some variation from the definition of a pure 
alliance, they implement the same concepts. 
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Table 2: Partnering vs. Alliancing 
 Partnering Alliancing 
Organization -Partnering Agreement/Charter (non-contractual) -Project Contract 
Relationships 
-Trust and relationship development 
   --Team building 
   --Communication protocols 
   --Stakeholder commitment 
   --Decision processes 
-Dispute resolution procedures 
(non-contractual) 
-Joint decision making 
   --Project management team:  
     Unanimous decisions 
   --Executive oversight team:   
     Unanimous decisions 
-Dispute resolution procedures 
(contractual) 
Risk -Division of liability -Fault-based claims 
-Shared liability 
-Waiver of consequential damages 
Performance 
-Set mutual goals (non-contractual) 
-Performance measures 
-Continuous improvement 
-Contractual profit sharing  
-Contractual loss sharing 
-Performance incentives 
-Continuous improvement 
Contracts 
Two commercially available boilerplate IPD contracts were evaluated for this 
paper: ConsensusDOCS 300 and AIA Document C191-2009.  ConsensusDOCS describes 
itself as “a coalition of associations representing diverse interests in the construction 
industry that collaboratively develops and promotes standard form construction contract 
documents that advance the construction process” (ConsensusDOCS, 2010). The 
organization counts 32 associations as part of their coalition, the most notable of which is 
the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC).  ConsensusDOCS 300 Standard 
Form of Tri-Party Agreement for Collaborative Project Delivery, first published in 
September 2007, is touted as the signature document of their catalog and the first 
standard construction contract to address Integrated Project Delivery (Perlberg, 2009). 
The American Institute of Architects first began publishing construction contracts 
in 1888, and currently publishes more than 120 contracts and administrative forms for the 
29 
construction industry (AIA, 2010b).  AIA publishes three series of Integrated Project 
Delivery documents, differentiated by how the parties contract with each other. Published 
in November 2009, AIA Document C191-2009 Standard Form Multi-Party Agreement 
for Integrated Project Delivery, like ConsensusDOCS 300, is a three party agreement 
between the owner, designer, and constructor.  AIA’s other IPD contracts allow for 
separate agreements between owner and designer and owner and constructor, as well as 
the formation of the three parties into a Limited Liability Corporation.  
Key Practices 
IPD aims to create a contractual environment fundamentally different than that of 
a traditional or partnering agreement contract, but when looking at specific contractually 
enforceable differences, ConsensusDOCS 300 and AIA C191 use five basic methods.  
These methods are 1). Joint Decision Making, 2). Shared Risk, 3). Budget Development 
and Management, 4). Pain/Gain Sharing and Incentives, and 5). Dispute Resolution. 
Joint Decision Making 
 Ensuring all parties are involved in decision making is essential to a collaborative 
project. Both contracts use an explicit joint decision making process as the cornerstone of 
the contract. They employ two managing bodies to execute a project: an executive team 
and a project team.  Each team is composed of a three-member core representing the 
principal parties of the Owner, Designer, and Constructor; with allowances for the 
addition of other interested parties when necessary.  The executive team provides senior 
oversight and decision making, while the project team provides day-to-day management.  
These teams are designed to make decisions in the best interest of the project as a whole, 
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not each member’s own interest.  To that end, the teams make decisions by unanimity 
(AIA) or consensus (ConsensusDOCS requires consensus for the executive team, but 
does not specifically designate a decision process for the project team).  If agreement 
cannot be reached between the three core members, the owner reserves the right to make 
a unilateral determination.   The other parties may dispute the owner’s decision through 
the dispute resolution provisions of the contract. 
Shared Risk 
 Provisions for sharing of project risks and waiving claims are another important 
element of the IPD contracts.  When implemented, the shared risk clauses waive the 
majority of claims except in cases of negligence, breach of contract, or when insurance 
proceeds are available for the claim.  Contractually shared risk forces the parties to act as 
a single team, removing the organizational barriers required of fault-based claim 
environments.  It creates an atmosphere where all parties are either going to win together 
or lose together.  
Budget Development and Management 
 IPD projects use a progressive approach to developing project cost estimates.  A 
not-to-exceed amount may be written into the original contract, but it represents an initial 
planning budget instead of a target cost.  From this initial budget, the Designer and 
Constructor develop preliminary cost models.  These cost models are regularly updated 
as the design phase progresses through specified milestones.  When the project design is 
sufficiently complete, the parties agree to a target cost for the project, which is not 
adjusted except in the case of a material change of work, differing site conditions, or 
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compensable delay.  This target is the cost utilized as a basis for payment to and 
cost/profit sharing with the Designer and Constructor. 
 This method of budget development takes advantage of increasing certainty in 
construction cost estimates as the project is designed.  A fixed price design and 
construction contract must decide on a final price while cost estimates contain many 
unknowns, but a contract that allows revisions to cost estimates can decide on a target 
cost when those costs are much more certain (Figure 2). 
                             100% 
 
                    % Design Cost variability 
                             Complete                                          
     Ceiling cost 
                                        35% 
  
     Target Cost 
Figure 2: Cone of Uncertainty 
(Adapted from Gannon, 2011) 
Pain/Gain Sharing and Incentives 
 The next technique further enforces a win-win (or lose-lose) atmosphere by 
integrating the project rewards (or losses).  When project costs are less than the target 
cost, a gain sharing agreement shares the savings among the parties according to 
predetermined percentages.  In the other case, when project costs exceed the target cost, 
pain sharing distributes the losses among the parties.  Pain sharing agreements often limit 
the designer’s and constructor’s losses to their overhead and profit, limiting their 
financial risk of joining a project.   
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 The contracts also allow for the Designer and Constructor to earn incentive 
payments for meeting performance benchmarks.  These plans can offer payments during 
the project for meeting certain goals, providing financial incentives earlier and/or in 
excess of the savings shared at the end of the project.  The details of the incentive plans 
are left to the project parties to decide at the beginning of the project as a contract 
amendment.  Incentives can be based on non-cost goals such as safety and quality, but are 
funded through project savings, so they depend on superior cost performance as well. 
Dispute Resolution  
 One of the keys of the IPD contracts is the utilization of established dispute 
resolution procedures, pre-agreed as a binding clause of the contract at its formation.  
They use a three-step dispute resolution procedure.  A dispute that cannot be resolved 
between the directly involved parties is first submitted to the joint executive team for 
resolution.  If the executive team is unable to resolve the issue, a third-party will mediate 
an agreement between the project participants.  If an acceptable settlement is still not 
agreed upon at this point, the binding resolution process is used.  The preferred option is 
binding arbitration through a pre-established method, such as the Construction Industry 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.  If binding arbitration is 
selected, the three parties agree to abide by it in lieu of litigation. Both contracts also 
offer traditional litigation for binding resolution if parties decline to agree to arbitration at 
the beginning of the project. 
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Selecting a Contract to Review 
The contract to be reviewed in this study was chosen by the Choosing by 
Advantages (CBA) decision-making system.  The central principles of CBA are that 
decision-makers must use sound decision-making methods, decisions must be based on 
the importance of advantages, and decisions must be anchored to the relevant facts (Suhr, 
1999).  To choose between the two alternatives, the attributes of each key practice were 
compared between contracts and the advantages identified.  Each key practice was scored 
equally.  Utilizing a decision table (Table 3), ConsensusDOCS 300 scores the most 
advantages.  AIA C191 scores an advantage by having a less ambiguous management 
structure.  While ConsensusDOCS and AIA use a similar Shared Risk and Pain/Gain 
Sharing method, ConsensusDOCS takes the advantage in both categories by providing 
more options and flexibility.  ConsensusDOCS 300’s use of milestone cost models and 
100% design target costing scores it an advantage in Budget Development and 
Management.  Both contracts have very similar Dispute Resolution methods and split that 
factor.  
Methodology 
An embedded single case study design was selected for this research, which is 
composed of a single case and multiple units of analysis (Yin, 2009). This type of study 
is appropriate to test a hypothesis with a clear set of propositions as well as clear 
circumstances within which they are believed to be true.  The FAR provides explicit 
circumstances under which to test if ConsensusDOCS 300 can be utilized in federal 
construction.  
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Table 3: Selecting Contract by Choosing by Advantages 
 ConsensusDOCS 300 
Joint 
Decision 
Making 
Advantage AIA C191: Management processes and teams more clearly 
defined 
(20 points) More defined processes decreases likelihood of conflict 
due to ambiguity 
Shared Risk 
Advantage ConsensusDOCS 300: Provides traditional liability option 
(20 points) Provides recourse in case of insurance difficulties 
Budget 
Development 
and 
Management 
Advantage ConsensusDOCS 300: Detailed milestone cost models.  
Target cost set after complete design. 
(20 points) Flexibility for cost changes during design.  More 
accurate cost without need for amendments. 
Pain/Gain 
Sharing 
Advantage ConsensusDOCS 300: Flexible pain sharing methods 
(20 points) Allows parties to accept greater risk/reward if desired 
Dispute 
Resolution 
(TIE) Advantage: Nonbinding mediation before binding arbitration 
(0 points) No significant difference 
Score:  
ConsensusDOCS 300: 60 
AIA C191 – 2009: 20 
 
The ConsensusDOCS 300 contract is divided into 25 Articles, seven of which are 
used to implement the key IPD practices. This study extracted the articles of the contract 
dealing with each alliance practice.  Each key practice was used as a unit of analysis for 
review by a panel of three U.S. Air Force contracting officers, each with extensive 
experience in construction contracting.  Each reviewer received a copy of the contract 
and a short form that specified the articles they were to review and the central clauses of 
each article.  The reviewers were asked to answer the following questions for each article 
of the contract: 
Do the terms of the contract meet the Federal Acquisition Regulations? 
 If so, are there any sections of the FAR that address the issue? 
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 If not, what specific section(s) of the FAR does not allow certain contract  
conditions?  
Do you see any potential alterations to the contract conditions that would bring 
them in line with the FAR? 
 A summary of the notable findings can be found in Table 4, indicating findings 
that impede or facilitate possible implementation under federal regulations.  When 
researching the reviewers’ findings, the authors discovered some additional findings 
which are included in the table.  This paper’s analysis was developed from a combination 
of the reviewers’ findings and interpretations, the authors’ own research and 
interpretations, and subsequent consultation with the reviewers. 
Tri-Party Agreement (Article 1) 
Article 1 is not necessarily an IPD key practice, but is an important facet of the 
contract that should be analyzed.  It arranges three distinct parties into a single contract.  
This is unusual in the federal sector, where typical construction contracts use either a 
single contract between the Owner and a Design-Build contractor or two separate 
contracts between the Owner/Designer and Owner/Constructor. However, there is a 
precedent of contracts requiring joint participation of prime contractors in the 
accomplishment of a requirement.  Air Force Informational Guidance 5317.9500 outlines 
Associate Contractor Agreements (ACA) that outline “the basis of sharing information, 
data, technical knowledge, expertise, and/or resources essential… to meet the terms of 
the contract” (Department of the Air Force, 2006).  This kind of agreement is similar to 
the way ConsensusDOCS 300 outlines the responsibilities and interactions between  
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Table 4: Impediments & Facilitators to ConsensusDOCS 300 Methods 
 Impediments Facilitators 
Tri-Party 
Agreement 
Article 1 
I-1.  No Precedent for Binding Tri- 
        Party Contract (33) 
I-2.  Competitive Selection  
        (6.101, 36.6) 
I-3.  Possible Organizational  
        Conflict of Interest (9.5) 
F-1.  Similar to Design-Build Method    
         (36.6) 
F-2.  Possible Use of Associate  
        Contractor Agreement  
        (Air Force IG5317.9500) 
Management 
Group  
Article 4 
I-1.  4.6
        Approval Required for   
 Contracting Officer  
        Decisions (1.601) 
F-1.  4.1; 4.6
        Contractor/Government  
 Parallels Existing  
        Relationship Precedents  
F-2.  4.1; 4.6
        Agreement (33.204) 
 Policy of Mutual  
F-3.  4.6
        Allows for Contracting Officer  
 Owner’s Final Determination  
        Approval (1.601) 
Shared Risk 
Article 3 
I-1.  3.8.2.1; 3.8.3
        Hazardous Indemnification  
 Limitations on  
        Authority (50.102-1d) 
I-2.  3.8.2.1-3
        Limited in Some Cases  
 Claims Cannot be  
        (11.5, 52.211-12,  33,  
        52.246-12) 
I-3.  3.8.3
        Under Certain Conditions  
 Consequential Damages  
        (52.249-10) 
F-1.  3.8.2.1, 3.8.3
        Indemnification Apply to  
 Limitations on  
        Unusually Hazardous Only  
        (50.102-1d) 
F-2.  3.8.2.2
        Adjustments (52.211-18, 52.236-2,  
 FAR Equitable  
        52.242-17, 52.243-1, 52.249-2) 
 
Budget, 
Compensation, 
Incentives, and 
Risk Sharing 
Articles 8-11 
I-1.  8.1.1
        Types (16.102a,b) 
 Restriction on Contract  
I-2.  8.1.1
        Competition (6.101, 16.104a) 
 Lack of Price  
I-3.  8.1, 8.3, 11.4, 11.5
        on Incentive Contracts  
 Limitations  
        (16.401a,d) 
F-1.  8.1, 8.3, 11.4, 11.5
        FAR Contract Types 
 Adaptable to  
        (16.403-1, 16.403-2) 
F-2.  11.2, 11.3
        Programs (16.402) 
 FAR Incentive  
 
Dispute 
Resolution 
Article 23 
I-1.  23.3-5
        Resolution Must be Voluntary  
 Alternative Dispute  
        (33.214.2) 
I-2.  23.5
        Arbitration (33.214.4g) 
 Strict Limits on Binding  
 
F-1.  23.2
        (33.204) 
 Policy of Mutual Agreement  
F-2.  23.3-5
        Dispute Resolution (33.214,  
 Precedence for Alternative  
        33.210, AFFARS 5333.290) 
F-3.  23.3-4 
        Neutral Party (33.214d) 
ADR Allows Use of  
1.1.1 – ConsensusDOCS 300 Clause Number Affected (Article 1 is a Single Clause) 
Parentheses Indicate FAR Section Referenced (or Other Reference if Indicated) 
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parties, and it could be argued that an alliance contract is just an extension of this idea.  
However, ACAs are not contracts and do not obligate the parties in the same way a 
contract does.  Arranging an alliance contract as an ACA would encounter many of the 
same difficulties as partnering agreements; without contractually binding provisions, 
parties are ultimately rewarded for acting in their own interest, not the project’s. 
A primary limitation in organizing a three party contract is the need to provide for 
full and open competition in the selection of two separate contractors, as required by 
FAR 6.101.  Because of the requirement for competition, the Designer and the 
Constructor would have to be selected by a separate solicitation and source selection 
processes.  In addition, 36.601-3 outlines distinct solicitation and source selection 
procedures to be used for Architect/Engineer (A/E) services.  Another limitation is 
potential conflicts of interest between contractors that enter the contract as separate 
entities, but may have previous shared relationships or financial interests.  Since the 
contract depends on collaborative principle and joint decision making, this could put the 
owner at an unfair negotiating position against a united front (perhaps a moot point when 
considering the Owner’s final decision power).  According to FAR 9.5, the contracting 
officer must identify and mitigate conflicts of interest.  All of these issues are resolvable, 
but significantly complicate the solicitation and selection process.  This could noticeably 
slow the project lead time, especially in the case of a protest of award.  
 A possible solution for these issues is to rearrange the contract to a Design-Build 
arrangement, in which the Designer and Constructor operate as a joint venture.  This 
would change some of the collaborative principles of the contract, such as reducing three 
party joint decision making to a two party arrangement.  Each member of the joint 
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venture would have to depend on a shared representative.  However, certain practices 
such as dispute resolution, shared risk, and incentives would still meet their original 
intent.  Pain/gain sharing could still operate as an effective incentive tool, only requiring 
the joint venture to internally agree on the share percentage between Designer and 
Constructor.  While an IPD Design-Build contract would require adept management 
between the Designer and Constructor, it likely provides the best arrangement for a 
federal alliancing contract. 
Joint Decision Making (Article 4) 
ConsensusDOCS 300 uses a project team known as the Collaborative Project 
Delivery (CPD) Team for day-to-day project management.  The CPD Team’s decision 
process is not expressly outlined in the contract, deferring the settlement of disputes to 
the executive team.  The executive team, known as the Management Group, is assigned 
the responsibilities of making joint decisions on issues beyond the scope of day-to-day 
management or in cases of disputes within the CPD Team.  The Management Group and 
its decision process are defined in clauses 4.1 and 4.6.  It is comprised of an authorized 
representative of the Owner, Designer, and Constructor.  The Management Group is to 
“act in the best interest of the Project as a whole without consideration to each member's 
own interest.”  Each decision is to be made, to the greatest extent possible, by consensus.  
When consensus cannot be reached “the Owner shall make a determination in the best 
interest of the Project as a whole subject to the dispute resolution process in Article 23” 
(ConsensusDOCS, 2007). 
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 Several reviewers cited existing precedents for very similar decision processes in 
federal defense contracts.  In particular, one reviewer expressed that this arrangement 
operates very similarly to the collaborative project management implemented in Air 
Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) Design-Build contracts.  
The FAR also directly supports joint decision making.  FAR 33.204 outlines that the 
“Government’s policy is to try to resolve all contractual issues in controversy by mutual 
agreement at the contracting officer’s level.”  
In regards to contract decisions made by the Management Group, the authority to 
enact contract actions is limited solely to contracting officers according to FAR 1.601 and 
1.602.  This may require that the Owner’s Management Group representative be the 
project contracting officer, or that all Management Group decisions be subject to 
contracting officer approval.  Since clause 4.6 already empowers final determination to 
the Owner, the Government retains the power to block any decisions that do not meet 
contracting officer approval.  Therefore the contract should not have any difficulty 
meeting the requirements of 1.601 and 1.602. 
Overall, the FAR does not provide any notable barriers to joint decision making.  
In fact, some areas of federal construction already use similar techniques.  However, an 
important issue when applying this practice to the Government is ensuring proper 
executive buy-in and representation in the Management Group.  Federal bureaucracy can 
cause leadership confusion and typically creates a disparity between the agency that 
executes construction projects and the agency that actually uses the facility.  Addressing 
these types of issues is essential to a successful executive decision making team. 
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Shared Risk (Article 3) 
 ConsensusDOCS 300 implements a shared risk environment primarily through 
clause 3.8.2.1, in which the parties release each other against liabilities arising from non-
negligent decisions, and 3.8.3, in which all parties waive claims against each other for 
consequential damages.   The FAR directly addresses these types of clauses in FAR 
50.102, in which it limits the authority of indemnification clauses in cases of “unusually 
hazardous or nuclear risks.”  “Unusually hazardous” is not defined by the FAR, but Air 
Force acquisition guidance describes unusually hazardous risks as a potential loss that 
would severely impact a contractor’s financial or productive capabilities, and for which 
sufficient insurance is not available (SAF/AQCS, 1998).  The majority of federal 
construction projects are unlikely to fall in this category, so this will not apply in most 
cases. 
The more glaring difficulty with these shared risk clauses are in cases where the 
FAR explicitly provides for damages, such as cases of liquidated damages, non-
performance, or default.  FAR 33.2 as well as the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 also 
expressly allow for contractors to apply for claims (United States Congress, 1978).  The 
explicit requirements of these regulations prevent the use of a blanket waiver of liability 
and damages.   
 However, ConsensusDOCS also offers a traditional risk option as an alternative.  
When using traditional risk, the contract suggests setting monetary limits on the total 
liability (beyond the coverage of insurance) the Designer and Constructor are subject to.  
However, this runs into the same difficulty with federal regulations as the shared risk 
liability waivers.  Fortunately, because of the strict requirements of the FAR, federal 
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contracts already provide a great deal of liability protection for contractors.  Numerous 
clauses provide for equitable adjustments for a contractor in certain circumstances, 
including government delay of work (52.242-17), changes (52.243-1), variations in 
estimated quantities (52.211-18), differing site conditions (52.236-2), and termination for 
convenience (52.249-2). 
Therefore, the FAR manages many contract performance risks through existing 
FAR clauses.  These clauses allow for a fact-finding and negotiation process to agree on 
the impact and resolution of unexpected events (risks).  Combined with Joint Decision 
Making and the other IPD key practices, this allows for a reasonable and equitable 
management of risk.  
Budget Development and Management and Pain/Gain Sharing (Articles 8-11) 
 ConsensusDOCS 300 does not include any provisions for competitive price 
proposals or any pre-contract price negotiations.  This presents a significant issue to the 
FAR, in which FAR 6.101 requires full and open competition in source selection, with 
16.104a establishing price as a primary competition concern.  ConsensusDOCS 300’s 
budget development model begins with a loose target budget that is successively 
narrowed down until a final target cost is determined at 100% design completion.  This 
model would first appear very difficult to fit into the typical FAR fixed-price or cost-
reimbursable price models, but the FAR provides strikingly similar contract models in 
Subpart 16.4: Incentive Contracts.  In 16.403-2:  Fixed-Price Incentive (Successive 
Targets) Contracts, the FAR provides a contract model that aligns quite closely with the 
intent of ConsensusDOCS 300, while allowing for cost negotiation and competition.  
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FAR 16.403-1 Fixed-Price (Firm Target) Contracts also meets some alliance concepts by 
providing pain/gain sharing, but does not provide progressive budget management.   
A fixed price incentive (successive targets) contract negotiates the following elements 
at the outset of the contract: 
1. An initial target cost. 
2. An initial target profit. 
3. An initial profit adjustment formula to be used for establishing the firm target 
profit, including a ceiling and floor for the firm target profit. 
4. The production point at which the firm target cost and firm target profit will be 
negotiated (usually before delivery or shop completion of the first item). 
5. A ceiling price that is the maximum that may be paid to the contractor, except for 
any adjustment under other contract clauses providing for equitable adjustment or 
other revision of the contract price under stated circumstances. 
This method moves the initial target costs and profits required in Articles 8.1.2 and 
8.1.3 from the start of project design to the solicitation and negotiation phase.  It also 
adds a ceiling price.  These are minor changes to the intent of ConsensusDOCS 300, but 
are significant changes in terms of meeting the FAR requirement for full and open 
competition.  They allow specific cost values that can be used for negotiation and 
competition.  The profit adjustment formula also allows for the parties to set a pain/gain 
sharing profit formula in accordance with the ConsensusDOCS contract.     
As specified in ConsensusDOCS 300 Article 8, the successive targets incentive 
contract allows the target cost to be improved until the firm target cost is set at a certain 
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production point, such as 100% design.   At this point, 16.403-2 allows for the parties to 
establish a formula for establishing the final price using the firm target cost and firm 
target profit.  The final cost is then negotiated at completion, and the final profit is 
established by the formula:   
“When the final cost is less than the target cost, application of the formula results in a 
final profit greater than the target profit; conversely, when final cost is more than 
target cost, application of the formula results in a final profit less than the target 
profit, or even a net loss. If the final negotiated cost exceeds the price ceiling, the 
contractor absorbs the difference as a loss. Because the profit varies inversely with 
the cost, this contract type provides a positive, calculable profit incentive for the 
contractor to control costs.” (FAR 16.403-1) 
This meets nearly the exact purpose of the pain/gain sharing principle of 
ConsensusDOCS 300.  The only key difference is the ability of the contract to allow for 
the contractors’ losses to be limited to their overhead and profit.  Loss limits are not an 
essential feature, but they can reduce the prevalence of contractor risk aversion behavior, 
such as padding estimates, inflating contingency funds, or abstaining from competing for 
a project altogether.  
However, the FAR does not leave the selection of contract type purely to contracting 
officer discretion.  First, there are limits on which contract types can be used in certain 
situations. FAR 6.102 establishes sealed bids as the preferred method of establishing full 
and open competition, and FAR 16.102 requires all sealed bid solicitations to uses a firm-
fixed-price or fixed-price contracts with economic price adjustment contract type.  
Therefore, to use an incentive contract the contracting officer must first make a case 
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against sealed bids.  FAR 6.401 outlines the four points on which this could be done, 
requiring the use of sealed bids when: 
1. Time permits the solicitation, submission, and evaluation of sealed bids;  
2. The award will be made on the basis of price and other price-related factors;  
3. It is not necessary to conduct discussions with the responding offerors about their 
bids;  
4. There is a reasonable expectation of receiving more than one sealed bid.  
The project contracting officer would have to make a case on one of these points that 
sealed bidding is not appropriate in order to avoid the fixed price requirement.  
Fortunately, this is not difficult and quite common.  The most typical method is by 
establishing non-price measures, such as technical qualifications or past performance, as 
significant selection criteria.  The contracting officer can then utilize best value source 
selection methods such as Performance Price Tradeoff or Full Tradeoff.   
Next, FAR 16.401(a&d) requires that in order to use an incentive contract, the 
contracting officer must make a determination and finding, signed by the head of the 
contracting activity, establishing that “a firm-fixed-price contract is not appropriate and 
the required supplies or services can be acquired at lower costs and, in certain instances, 
with improved delivery or technical performance, by relating the amount of profit or fee 
payable under the contract to the contractor’s performance.”  This may be a more 
difficult case to make, but it can use many of the same arguments as would be used to 
avoid sealed bids, specifically the importance of quality and performance criteria to the 
success of the project. 
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 Finally, fixed price incentive (successive targets) contracts come with their own 
limitations, stated in 16.403-2.  They can only be used when: 
1. The contractor’s accounting system is adequate for providing data for negotiating 
firm targets and a realistic profit adjustment formula, as well as later negotiation 
of final costs; and  
2. Cost or pricing information adequate for establishing a reasonable firm target cost 
is reasonably expected to be available at an early point in contract performance.  
Fortunately, both of the points made by these limitations can be reasonably expected 
to be met in a typical construction project. All of these requirements present challenges to 
the project contracting officer, but none of them are insurmountable.  In fact, once a 
suitable case is made for a successive target incentive contract for one construction 
project, it could likely be easily revised to apply to most subsequent projects. 
Incentive Program (Article 11) 
Article 11.2 of ConsensusDOCS 300 outlines the development of an incentive 
program to reward superior performance, based on project expectations and benchmarks.  
This IPD key practice is directly addressed by FAR 16.402-2, 3, and 4; allowing for 
performance, delivery, and multiple-incentive contracts, respectfully.  ConsensusDOCS 
300 leaves open to the Management Group the establishment of the details of an 
incentive program, but  FAR Part 16 makes provisions for incentive arrangements that 
align with the alliancing goals envisioned by ConsensusDOCS.  However, incentive 
programs are under the same conditions of FAR 16.401(a&d) previously identified for 
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incentive contracts, requiring a determination and finding that they are in the best interest 
of the Government.  
Dispute Resolution (Article 23)   
The FAR sets a clear policy in 33.204 of trying to settle contractual issues by mutual 
agreement at the contracting officer’s level prior to submission of a claim.  This precisely 
agrees with the direct discussion and Management Group decision procedures of 
ConsensusDOC 300 Article 23.2. In regards to Articles 23.3 and 23.4’s use of mitigation 
or mediation, ConsensusDOCS 300’s dispute resolution procedures closely resemble the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) components of the FAR.  FAR 33.210 allows and 
encourages the use of ADR to resolve any claim over which the contracting officer would 
have decision authority, which includes all claims except those involving fraud or for 
which another agency has authority.  FAR 33.214 allows the use of ADR when the 
following elements exist: 
1. Existence of an issue in controversy 
2. A voluntary election by both parties to participate in the ADR process 
3. An agreement on alternative procedures and terms to be used in lieu of formal 
litigation  
4. Participation in the process by officials of both parties who have the authority to 
resolve the issue in controversy 
5. The confidentiality of ADR proceedings are protected consistent with 
5 U.S.C. 574 
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6. The solicitation does not require arbitration as a condition of award, unless 
otherwise required by law 
FAR 33.214d also allows a neutral party to “facilitate resolution of the issue in 
controversy using the procedures chosen by the parties.”  With the limitations listed 
above, these regulations give the project contracting officer the capability to execute the 
first three dispute resolution methods used by ConsensusDOCS 300: direct discussions, 
mitigation, and mediation.   
However, there are strict limits on the final method of binding arbitration.  Binding 
arbitration authority is specifically limited by 33.214g to the guidelines of individual 
agencies, so its use is determined by the specific agency.  This limitation comes from the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, which states in section 575(c): 
“Prior to using binding arbitration under this subchapter, the head of an agency, in 
consultation with the Attorney General and after taking into account the factors in 
section 572(b), shall issue guidance on the appropriate use of binding arbitration and 
when an officer or employee of the agency has authority to settle an issue in 
controversy through binding arbitration.” (United States Congress, 1996) 
The Department of the Navy (2007) is one such agency that has published 
instructions for use of binding arbitration.  This document has strict instructions and 
limitations on the implementation of binding arbitration; including the parties involved, 
when it may be used, how arbitration agreements are written, the choice of arbitrator, the 
conduct of arbitration hearings, arbitration awards, and the judicial review of arbitration 
awards.   
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These rigorous and extensive directives would make binding arbitration a difficult 
endeavor, especially since they still allow for legal review subsequent to the decision.   
While binding arbitration is designed to offer a timelier and less costly method of final 
resolution, litigation will ultimately serve the same purpose.  In fact, ConsensusDOCS 
300 recognizes that some parties may prefer or require litigation, offering it as an 
alternative to binding arbitration in the contract.  Ultimately, the intent of dispute 
resolution is to expressly agree on dispute procedures before a dispute occurs and to offer 
the parties opportunities to resolve the dispute amicably before a binding resolution is 
required.  The FAR allows for this intent to be maintained. 
Conclusions 
Of the five key IPD practices in ConsensusDOCS 300, only Shared Risk and the 
binding arbitration component of Dispute Resolution cannot be effectively implemented 
under current regulations.  While not a key practice, ConsensusDOCS 300’s tri-party 
contractual method also runs into difficulties.  However, each of these limitations can be 
addressed without severely limiting the effectiveness of a comprehensive alliancing 
contract.  
First, Design-Build would be the most reasonable method for a federal alliancing 
project.  While the tri-party agreement could be quite effective in the civilian sector, 
Design-Build allows for the use of contracting and source selection methods that are 
already established in the federal government.  It is an unnecessary distraction to attempt 
to break new ground on contracting and bidding methods when they are not directly 
related to the key practices we are trying to implement.  Other than requiring some 
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additional coordination internal to the contractor, Design-Build does not detract from the 
alliancing practices. 
However, some compromises are required for the key practices of Shared Risk 
and Dispute Resolution.   Unfortunately, a shared risk of liabilities is not feasible in 
federal construction.  Neither is ConsensusDOCS 300’s alternative of traditional risk 
allocation with liability limits.  One of the goals of an alliance embodied by sharing risk 
is to create a cohesive team that shares wins or losses together.  Traditional risk does not 
enhance this goal, but much of it is still retained by Joint Decision Making and Pain/Gain 
Sharing.  Another benefit of shared risks or contractor liability limits is reducing 
contractors’ financial risk, the cost of which is almost always passed on to the Owner.  
Federal contracts already address many of these issues in their existing equitable 
adjustment clauses.  Therefore, the existing federal construction risk structure can be used 
without losing significant value of the alliancing contract. 
Finally, a federal alliancing contract would need to use litigation in place of 
binding arbitration, an option already recognized in ConsensusDOCS 300.  The potential 
cost and time savings of binding arbitration would be lost.  But, the contract can retain 
the benefits of setting clear procedures before a dispute creates an adversarial relationship 
and providing the parties opportunity to resolve disputes amicably before a binding 
resolution.   
The remaining key practices (Joint Decision Making, Budget Development and 
Management, Pain/Gain Sharing and Incentives) can be achieved without any 
compromise from ConsensusDOCS 300.  While the decision-making teams must be 
carefully assembled, there is no reason the Joint Decision Making clauses cannot be 
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replicated in a federal contract.  With proper contracting officer justification, 
ConsensusDOCS’s Budget Development and Management, Pain/Gain Sharing, and 
Incentives practices can be accomplished through the FAR’s incentive contract methods.  
We hope federal construction authorities will use these guidelines to draft a 
federal contract that implements alliancing key practices.  New techniques always carry 
some risk, but several existing federal contracting avenues, such as 8(a) set-aside or 
AFCEE’s construction programs, provide direct access to stable, capable, vetted, and 
experienced contractors that could be used to minimize this risk.  Partnering has served 
an effective first step into relational contracting during the last 23 years, but it is time to 
take the next one.  The private sector may have taken the lead this time, but there is still 
time for federal construction to catch up.   
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IV. Conclusion 
Chapter Overview 
The scholarly article submitted to ASCE Journal of Construction Engineering 
and Management communicates all the prominent results of the research, including the 
answers to the research questions and conclusions.  This chapter discusses the 
significance of the research, its limitations, and possible future research on this subject.  
Significance of Research 
The purpose of this research is to provide the Air Force (AF) and Department of 
Defense (DoD) alternative and potentially more successful construction contracting 
methods.  While civilian contracting is free to use a wide range of methods, federal 
contracting is much more limited by laws and regulations.  This research opens the 
possibility for the DoD to achieve the same improved project success alliancing contracts 
have brought to civilian construction by developing a framework under which alliancing 
contract methods can be used within the requirements of the FAR. 
Limitations 
 There are several limitations to the method utilized by this research.  The first is 
the dependence on a qualitative interpretation of ConsensusDOCS 300 and of the FAR.  
There is potential for variability in interpretation or misinterpretation, either in the 
reviewers’ interpretation of the contract or the FAR or the authors’ interpretation of the 
reviewers’ input.  This research also relies on a small sample size of expert reviewers.  
While each reviewer has extensive experience in construction contracting, the sample 
was not random or fully representative of federal legal and contracting experts.  Finally, 
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because the research only reviewed the portion of the ConsensusDOCS 300 that directly 
represented alliancing key practices, there is a possibility that the selected clauses were 
not properly represented without their full context. 
Future Research 
 An important step in implementing the recommendations of this research is to use 
the results to fully develop a complete federal alliancing contract document.  A standard 
form federal alliance contract, reviewed and vetted by proper authorities, would 
significantly assist federal construction practitioners in utilizing an alliancing contract in 
their construction contracts.   
 Another valuable research topic would be a quantitative comparison of contract 
performance between traditional, partnering, and alliancing contracts, similar to the 
partnering versus non-partnering study performed by Weston and Gibson (1993).  While 
significant theory and qualitative research exists, quantitative evidence of improved 
performance is an important step before alliancing becomes the construction standard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
Bibliography 
AIA - The American Institute of Architects.  AIA Document C191 - 2009. Washington, 
DC: American Institute of Architects, 2009. 
AIA - The American Institute of Architects.  Integrated Project Delivery: Case Studies. 
Sacramento, CA: AIA California Council, 2010a. 
AIA - The American Institute of Architects. (2010b). History of AIA contract documents. 
<http://www.aia.org/contractdocs/AIAS076671>  (Oct. 27, 2010) 
Bresnen, M., & N. Marshall. “Building partnerships: Case studies of client-contractor 
collaboration in the UK construction industry.” Construction Management and 
Economics, 18(7): 819-832 (2000a).  
-----.  “Motivation, commitment and the use of incentives in partnerships and alliances.” 
Construction Management and Economics, 18(5): 587-598 (2000b). 
Chan, A. P. C., E. W. L. Cheng, and H. Li. Consultancy Report on Construction 
Partnering in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Housing Society, 2001. 
Chan, A. P. C., D. Scott, & A.P.L. (2004). “Factors affecting the success of a 
construction project.” Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 
130(1): 153-155 (2004). 
Chan, A. P., Chan, D. W., & Yeung, J. F.  Relational Contracting for Construction 
Excellence. New York: Academic Press, 2010.  
Cheng, E. W. L., & H. Li. “Construction partnering process and associated critical 
success factors: Quantitative investigation.” Journal of Management in Engineering, 
18(4): 194-202 (2002). 
54 
ConsensusDOCS. ConsensusDOCS 300: Standard Form of Tri-Party Agreement for 
Collaborative Project Delivery, Arlington, VA: ConsensusDOCS LLC, 2007. 
ConsensusDOCS. (2010). About ConsensusDOCS. <http://consensusdocs.org/about/> 
(Oct. 27, 2010). 
D'Amato, A. “On consensus.” Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 8: 104-122 
(1970). 
Department of the Air Force.  Associate Contractor Agreements.  IG 5317.9500.  
Washington: HQ USAF, 2006.  
-----. Military Construction Program Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Budget Estimates. 
Justification Data Submitted to Congress.  Washington: HQ USAF, 2010. 
Department of the Navy.  Use of Binding Arbitration for Contract Controversies.  
SECNAV Instruction 5800.15.  Washington: HQ USN, 2007.  
Department of Treasury and Finance. (2009). Project Alliancing. 
<http://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/CA25713E0002EF43/pages/project-alliancing> (Feb. 15, 
2010) 
Federal Acquisition Regulation. (2005). <https://www.aqusisition.gov/far/html> (Feb. 17, 
2011) 
Gannon. Timothy W.  Understanding Schedule Forecasting Shortfalls in Federal Design-
Build Facility Procurement.  MS Thesis, AFIT/GEM/ENV/11M-02.  Air Force 
Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, March 2011. 
George A. Fuller Co. v. United States, 69 F. Supp, 409 (Ct. Cl. 1947). 
Gerard, J. "Construction." Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 
121(3): 319-328 (1995). 
55 
Gerrard, R. “Relational contracts - NEC in perspective.” Lean Construction Journal, 
2(1): 80-86 (2005). 
Gerybadze, A. Strategic Alliances and Process Redesign. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 
1995. 
Kenny, A. Wittgenstein. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1975. 
Kumaraswamy, M. M., M. Rahman, F. Y. Y. Ling, and S. T. Phng. "Reconstructing 
Cultures for Relational Contracting." Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management, 131(10): 1065-1075 (2005). 
Larson, E. “Project partnering: Results of study of 280 construction projects.” Journal of 
Management in Engineering, 11(2): 30-35 (1995).  
-----.  “Partnering on construction projects: A study of the relationship between 
partnering activities and project success.” IEEE Transactions on Engineering and 
Management, 44(2): 188-195 (1997).  
Luck, L., D. Jackson, and K. Usher. "Case Study: A Bridge Across the Paradigms." 
Nursing Inquiry, 13(2): 103-109 (2006). 
Macaulay, S. "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study." American 
Sociological Review, 28(1): 55-67 (1963). 
Macneil, I. R. "The Many Futures of Contracts." Southern California Law Review, 47(2): 
691-816 (1974). 
-----.  The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980. 
McClosky, H. “Consensus and ideology in American politics.” The American Political 
Science Review, 58(2): 361-382 (1964). 
56 
Moore, C., D. Mosley, and M. Slagle. "Partnering Guidelines for Win-Win Project 
Management." Project Management Journal, 23(1): 18-21 (1992). 
Naoum, S. "An Overview into the Concept of Partnering." International Journal of 
Project Management, 21(1): 71-6 (2003). 
NEC. (2010). What is the NEC.  <http://www.neccontract.com/about/index.asp> (Oct. 27, 
2010) 
Nyström, J. "The Definition of Partnering as a Wittgenstein Family-Resemblance 
Concept." Construction Management and Economics, 23(5): 473-481 (2005). 
OGC - Office of Government Commerce. (2006). Newsroom. 
<http://www.ogc.gov.uk/news_2006_4346.asp> (Oct. 27, 2010) 
Perlberg, B. M.  Contracting for Integrated Project Delivery: ConsensusDOCS. Chevy 
Chase, MD: Victor O. Schinnerer & Company, Inc, 2009. 
Post, N. M. “Integrated-project-delivery boosters ignore many flashing red lights.” 
Engineering News Record, 6 May 2010. 
Ross, J. “Introduction to project alliancing.” Defence Partnering & Alliances 
Conferences, Canberra, Australia, November (2001). 
SAF/AQCS (Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition). Air Force indemnification guide for 
unusually hazardous or nuclear risks Revision A. Washington DC: Pentagon, 1998.   
Sanders, Steve R., and Mary M. Moore. "Perceptions of Partnering in the Public Sector." 
Project Management Journal, 23(4): 13-19 (1992). 
57 
Schroer, Charles R. "Corps of Engineer's Perspective on Partnering." The use of 
Partnering in the Facilities Design Process: Summary of a Symposium. Ed. Federal 
Construction Counsel. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994. 
 
Suhr, Jim.  The Choosing By Advantages Decisionmaking System. Westport, CT: Quorum 
Books, 1999.  
United States Congress.  Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996.  Public Law No. 
104-320, 104th Congress.  Washington:GPO, 1996.  
United States Congress.  Contract Disputes Act of 1978.  Public Law No.  
95-563, 95th Congress.  Washington:GPO, 1978.  
Walker, A. Project Management in Construction. Oxford: BSP Professional Books, 
1989. 
Walker, D. H. T., K. Hampson, and R. Peters. “Project alliancing and project partnering - 
what's the difference? Partner selection on the Australian national museum project - 
A case study.” Proceedings of CIBW92 procurement system symposium on 
information and communication in constructions projects, 641-655 (2000).   
-----.  "Project Alliancing Vs Project Partnering: A Case Study of the Australian National 
Museum Project." Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 7(2): 83-91 
(2002). 
Weston, D., and G. Gibson. “Partnering Project Performance in US Army Corps of 
Engineers.” Journal of Management in Construction, 9(4): 331-344, 1993.  
Williams, A. E. Partnering. Commander’s Policy Memorandum #4. Washington, DC:  
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, 1993 
58 
Wright, Q. “Custom as a basis for international law in the post-war world.” Texas 
International Law Forum, 2: 147 (1966). 
Yeung, J. F. Y., A. P. C. Chan, and D. W. M. Chan. "The Definition of Alliancing in 
Construction as a Wittgenstein Family Resemblance Concept." International Journal 
of Project Management, 25(12): 219-31 (2007). 
Yin, R. K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2009. 
59 
Vita 
Capt Travis R. Johnson graduated in the class of 2001 from Spencer-Van Etten 
High School in Spencer, New York.  He entered undergraduate studies at Rochester 
Institute of Technology in Rochester, NY where he graduated with a Bachelor of Science 
degree in Mechanical Engineering in May 2006.  He was commissioned into the United 
States Air Force through Detachment 538 AFROTC.   
His first assignment was as Base Mechanical Engineer at 14th Civil Engineer 
Squadron, Columbus AFB, Mississippi.  From May 2008 to Nov 2008, he deployed to Al 
Asad Air Base, Iraq, serving as a design engineer on Facility Engineer Team Detachment 
14.  Upon returning to Columbus AFB, he became the Readiness and Emergency 
Management Flight Commander.   In August 2009 he entered the Graduate School of 
Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of Technology, where he earned a 
Master’s of Science degree in Engineering Management with a focus in Construction 
Management.  Upon graduation, he will be assigned to the 820th Red Horse Squadron, 
Nellis AFB, Nevada. 
60 
 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments 
regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, 
Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, 
VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply 
with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
24-03-2011 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis  
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
Sep 2009 – March 2011 
TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 
Application of Relational Contracting Methods to Federal 
Construction Projects 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Johnson, Travis R., Captain, USAF 
 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
  Air Force Institute of Technology 
 Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/ENV) 
 2950 Hobson Way, Building 640 
 WPAFB OH 45433-7765 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
     AFIT/GEM/ENV/11-M03 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
      Intentionally left blank 
   
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
ACRONYM(S) 
Fill in 
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
     APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 
United States. 
14. ABSTRACT  
Relational contracting is a method designed to improve relationships between contracted parties.  The federal 
construction sector was a leader in the development and implementation of an early form of relational contracting 
known as partnering.  Since then, alliancing has emerged as the new evolution of relational contracts.  While it 
provides many potential benefits to contracting parties, alliancing has not yet been utilized in federal construction 
procurement, which is subject to stringent regulations. 
A commercially available standard form alliancing contract was selected for analysis against the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation.  Key practices that characterize the alliancing method were identified.  Utilizing a panel of federal 
contracting experts, qualitative data were gathered to analyze which of these key practices do or do not comply with 
federal regulations, why certain practices do not comply, and how those practices could achieve compliance.   
The results show that most alliancing key practices can be utilized in a federal acquisition project.  While some 
practices cannot be used effectively under current regulations, these limitations do not significantly hinder the use of 
a comprehensive and effective federal alliancing contract. 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
Scheduling, production control, lean construction, federal facility procurement, public sector construction, construction 
management 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF: 
17. LIMITATION 
OF  
     ABSTRACT 
 
UU 
18. 
NUMBER  
OF PAGES 
 
60 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Peter Feng, Lt Col, USAF  ADVISOR 
a. 
REPORT 
 
U 
b. 
ABSTRACT 
 
U 
c. THIS 
PAGE 
 
U 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
(937) 255-6565, ext 4648 
(peter.feng@afit.edu) 
   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
